Gabby Agbonlahor’s winner for Villa against Liverpool could be aptly described as a “jammy corner goal”. The ball bounced off Phillippe Senderos’s coconut of a head, fell onto Gabby’s foot, deflected off Manquillo, and rolled into the far corner. But if you think back to before the corner, the goal, in its entirety, summed up Villa’s performance.
Liverpool’s Sakho had possession of the ball and tried to play an incisive pass forwards to Coutinho, but Villa sprung one of their defensive traps. Coutinho appeared to be unmarked when Sakho was looking to play forward, but Delph and Westwood were waiting, five yards away, for a ball to be played in. They sprung on him immediately, winning possession in the middle of the park and starting the break. Delph then played the ball wide to Hutton who launched a ball up to Agbonlahor. The English striker sprinted 30 yards and used his pace and strength to absolutely outwork Sakho and win the corner. Villa utilized their tactical plan, hard work and determination, physicality, and set piece strength to create a goal that shouldn’t have been.
The midfield trap that initially won the ball for the goal was just one of many employed by Villa in the match. The two types of passes that they principally tried to eliminate were direct balls from the holding midfielders to the attacking midfielders and attacking passes from the full backs. Keeping the ball from moving on the ground between the defensive players and the attacking players allowed them to, with 10 men behind the ball, neutralize any significant threat from Liverpool. It’s telling that Liverpool’s best chances came from individual brilliance, not team play.
First, we’ll look at the strong side traps. In these situations, when Liverpool were even with Villa numerically, the Birmingham outfit waited for the pass to reach the fullback, then kicked the press into high gear, marking all of his close options extremely closely. The idea here is that you either get them moving backwards or you get the ball.
In the first example above, Sakho swings the ball over to Moreno and, after Moreno plays it up to Lallana, the teeth come out from the Villa midfield and defense. Their reactivity and work rate made it so that the only tenable option was retreat.
On the other side of the pitch, a similar trap is employed as Markovic receives the ball around the halfway line and is presented with no forward options. It’s obvious that Lambert coached up these situations in advance as the players hunted in a way that was almost robotic. This prevention of forward progress was crucial to winning the tempo battle.
The weak side traps, on the other hand, were so effective that they became almost an offensive outlet for Villa. Below you’ll see Sakho metronomically and mindlessly swing the ball to Moreno, who’s outnumbered as he tries to move forward (which alone is illustrative of the Spaniard’s Premier League naïveté). He has no forward option and, in try to play a stupid one-two with Lallana, he gifts Villa possession in a dangerous area.
The passage below, from midway through the second half, showed all phases of Villa’s trapping deployment. They first forced Liverpool backwards on the strong side wing, then rushed out into midfield to prevent any easy entry passes, and finally pressurized the weak side wing to create a change in possession. Liverpool decision to set up in a five man midfield instead of the diamond that they’d been having success with seemed to doom them from the start against this Villa team.
These were the lineups deployed after Lambert quickly moved out of a midfield diamond when he realized Rodgers was playing five in midfield.
The tightness and organization of the defensive 4-3-3 against Rodger’s wide midfield worked like a charm. There were two-on-one defensive situations all over the pitch and Villa often won the ball back easily. They weren’t able to create much out of these changes in possession and, if they had the quality and hold up play of a player like Benteke in the side, it could have been worse for Liverpool.
On the other side of the coin, Liverpool’s manager and their fans have good reason to curse Roy Hodgson. His alleged mishandling of Daniel Sturridge not only kept out one of their best players, but also left them bereft of fluidity. Balotelli is effective as a fulcrum in attack, with good hold-up play and physicality, but Liverpool were crying out for a forward like Sturridge who’s willing to come wide, play on the wing, and create numerical advantages. Sterling could have also fulfilled this role if he hadn’t been rested. I’m not sure that Balotelli can be effective as a lone striker in Rodger’s system; he looked much like Diego Costa has in Spain side that demands more creativity and fluidity from their forwards: lost and ineffective.
Villa’s traps and removal of options led to Liverpool’s defending players (the back four, Henderson, and Mignolet) passing the ball almost twice as much as the rest of the team. Possession without a cutting edge is worthless and that’s all you got from Rodgers today. Paul Lambert’s tactics both prevented Liverpool from getting into their preferred attacking positions and drew the Merseyside team into new and uncomfortable positions in order to try and add more sting to their attack. The Scottish manager should receive the plaudits here and he has clearly got Brendan Rodgers’ number away from home.
This performance will also compound the fear that Rodgers is not a tactically reactive manager. He’s very proactive and has strong ideas about the game of football, but he should have recognized Villa’s ability to deal with his base formation and rerolled the dice. He won’t come against many sides as organized as Villa were today, but his trouble against the midtable sides that are is becoming a pattern. They struggled against Stoke, Hull, Villa, and Crystal Palace (once Pulis became manager) last season and Rodger’s will need to work on a Plan B to cement his status as one of Europe’s elite young managers.
Time to hit the slopes!
Louis Van Gaal promised change when he was made Manchester United manager. He suggested that a departure from the sadness of the previous nine months and a reversion to the confidence of the Sir Alex Ferguson era was in store. And all summer and preseason it looked like he’d delivered. The club brought in shiny new players that could work with his preferred 3-5-2 system, Luke Shaw and Ander Herrera, and they rolled through the competition in their preseason tour of the United States. But against Swansea on Saturday, United produced more of the same: inert possession and home disappointment.
Before delving into the tactical undoing of United at the weekend (and it was that, not mere bad luck or poor finishing), its important to give a bit of credit to Swansea who set up to deal with the system fantastically and were well organized at the back. A formation with one striker is always going to give the 3-5-2 difficulty, because you’re often put in positions where three players are marking one (in this case the central defenders and the lone striker). That “over-marking” leaves you short of players elsewhere on the park and Swansea’s first goal, a brilliant 29 pass move that has already been examined to death, was a perfect example of how winning the numbers game creates both time on the ball and space on the field. Angel Rangel and Ashley Williams both impressed in defense, while Ben Davies’ stand-in, Neil Taylor, had a game to forget. Gylfi Sigurdsson was immense in his return for the Swans.
The 3-5-2, like most football formations, is ideologically sound. It’s predicated on the idea that a team will earn a numerical advantage in midfield while attacking, and a numerical advantage in defense while defending. This is enabled by the use of wingbacks, players that serve either an attacking and defending role based on the possession and location of the ball and start higher up the pitch than the traditional fullback. The Netherlands team that the Louis Van Gaal coached to the third place trophy at the World Cup had two players perfectly suited to this role in Daley Blind and Daryl Janmaat. In addition to wingbacks, the left and right centerback roles are also specialized for the system. These players need to be able to push up into midfield occasionally and (generally) have the footedness of the side they’re playing on as they spend more time in possession than they might in a four-man defense.
United’s failure on Saturday came down to a lack of understanding and a lack of specialization. The solutions to both of these problems will come with time. The team is still inexperienced in this new tactic and the new roles they’re playing within it. Players like Luke Shaw and Antonio Valencia will provide a huge boost when they recover from injury. Until then, however, it might be a bit of rough sailing, as some of the mistakes on Saturday were basic and horrific.
- Juan Mata played far too high up the pitch the entire match. He was basically operating as a secondary striker/number 10. This would be fine in the attacking third, but he wasn’t coming back to receive the ball enough when United were deep and possession. As a result Herrera and Fletcher were anesthetized as they became swamped in midfield and could only really pass the ball to the backline and the wingbacks. Because of Mata’s positional error, United were always a man down in midfield and gaps started appearing between the lines for Swansea to exploit. I’m not sure he can even play in this system. It requires too much mental fortitude and consistency for an indulgent player like him. Jose Mourinho let him go because he lacked the discipline to perform in his Chelsea team and Van Gaal might be feeling a bit of history repeating itself. On Monday Night Football, Gary Neville did an excellent job of showing one of Mata’s situational failures; when United were in defense he left his man, Ki, to pursue the ball. This wound up giving him the space to score the opening goal. We already knew about his shortcomings in defense, but to also see him so lazy and tactically naïve when United were in possession was a surprise.
- The centerbacks clearly have not had enough time. Against a lone striker one of the three defenders has to move up into the midfield whenever the striker drops deep to mark him. When this happens the rest of the team drops into a flatback four and it works terrifically. Bruno Martins Indi got done a few times at the World Cup, typical for an inexperienced player, but also he did a tremendous job of tracking dangerous players into the midfield and stopping moves before they could start. He was instrumental to the Netherlands’ success. On Saturday, Wilfried Bony was ostensibly allowed free reign drop in between the midfielders and the defenders, receive the ball and hold it up for his fellow attackers. That time on the ball allowed Swansea a foothold in the game.
- The wing backs have been much discussed in the media, but the only point I’d like to hammer home is that, if your starting position is going to be at fullback (as it was in this game), you need a defensive player in that position or you’re not really benefitting from the talents that your wide players bring to the table. Januzaj was absolutely rampant going up against Taylor, but his introduction into the game also exposed how much better United were in attack when they played a 3-4-1-2 as compared to the 5-2-1-2 that they started out the match in. As the home side, and the side supposed to be attacking, United’s wingbacks should have been pushing Swansea’s wingers deeper into their own half. If Mata had actually kept a three man midfield in shape, this would have opened up the middle of the park for United and allowed the wingbacks enough the defensive space recover into when they lost the ball.
- In the second half, Manchester United switched to a 4-5-1, bringing on Nani, taking off Hernandez, and moving Jones over to fullback. Yet the problem with too few men in the midfield persisted. Many of United’s players just don’t have the right mentality as of now. You can’t have 4 players on the pitch (Mata, Nani, Januzaj, Young) who are only comfortable going forward. They’ve been asked to take on greater responsibilities and they just don’t currently have the mental or physical attributes to perform them. Look at the image below to see the effect that this imbalance has on a team. The lines between midfield and attack are stretched and there are few options to play out of the back. This led to the club revisiting the much maligned Moyes tactic of “lumping it up onto Fellaini’s head”.
- To Young’s credit, he worked very hard in a position that he has never played much before, but when he was clearly beaten for Swansea’s final goal all of his naiveté as a defender was on display. Keeping him on as an out and out fullback was a mistake that was going to be punished.
It’s not all doom and gloom for United. The signing of left-footed centerback Marcos Rojo is a perfect move for the team. The former Sporting Lisbon defender is comfortable at centerback or leftback, has skill and ability on the ball, and is a nice physical player with good speed and strength. These qualities are hugely important for the specialized position of left centerback in a three-man defense. Juventus’s Chielliini is the prototype at that spot, but I’d bet that Rojo can come in and do a great job for the Red Devils. Rojo has his flaws, he’s too aggressive, gets a little lost positionally, and has a tough time marking quick players, but they’ll be mitigated if he plays the stopping defender role and Evans plays cover (as seems most likely).
Make sure to check-in next week to see how the team is evolving. I wouldn’t bet against Van Gaal just yet, at least not until Shaw and Valencia return. United have too much quality injured or unfit to fairly judge their sour performance at the weekend. As is, its a minor hiccup on the road back to the top 4.
One of my best friends from high school texted me the other day and told me that he was joining his “highly competitive” office fantasy league this year. The text, however, came because he knows next to nothing about the Premier League and the players that populate it. He wanted advice, but rather than just suggest players that he should either buy or avoid, I sat down and tried to empirically discover which positions scored the most, which provided the largest “advantage”, which were “the safest”, and which provided the most “value”. To do this, I sampled last season’s top 40 players at each position (sorted by total points) and also the top 40 players in price at each position. I found some interesting, counter-intuitive, information.
We’ll start with the base formation. I found that 4-5-1 is the formation that will maximize the amount of points one can score relative to the other teams in the league (with caveats that I’ll get to later). This is simply because the average midfielder and defender scores more than the average forward. The mean midfielder scoring from last season was 129 points, while the mean defender scoring was 118. Forwards only scored 104 points on average.
But it’s also hugely important that the lone striker in the 4-5-1 is an excellent player. Forwards have the greatest deviation from that mean, with a standard deviation of 44 points. This means that picking one of the top 10 forwards is extremely important to success in the league and no expense should be spared in securing a Rooney or Dzeko type that represents guaranteed goals. A forward one deviation above the mean is more valuable, albeit marginally, than an average defender.
One’s midfield should do the heavy lifting for their team and be full of excellent players. The position has a moderate deviation of 31 points, but scores the highest on average at 129 points. The average price of £7m should really be considered the spending basement at the position. The Toures, Hazards, and Silvas of the league, players that both score and create goals, provide huge value and are the building block of success for one’s team.
Finally, defense is an interesting position because there are a few £7m players, but then everyone else is available at a relatively affordable price. Should you go all out for Coleman and Ivanovic, or save your money on players like Shaw and Lovren? The data shows that the top 40 defenders both have the lowest average price at £5.5m and the lowest standard deviation from the mean, only 25 points. Scouting out some bargains at this position will allow one to invest elsewhere in the team without losing many points. Here’s a tip: If money is tight, invest in players from defensive teams like Crystal Palace, Hull, and West Ham. They won’t be glamorous, but they shouldn’t cost too many points over the course of a season if they’re rotated out before “big six” fixtures.
As a general philosophy one should be looking to spend the bulk of their funds on one striker and five midfielders, then fill the rest of the team from there. Scouting out effective bargains and subs is a huge part of constructing a dominant side; buying a cheap striker that goes on to bang in the goals enables one to downgrade their expensive striker to a more modestly priced backup and even further reinforce the totality of the team. Here are my five favorite “sleeper” picks. (Disclaimer: there are a disproportionate number of forwards and defenders, because this guide is based on the 4-5-1.)
Ings has three excellent skills, pace, dribbling, and finishing, that should translate well to the counter attacking game that Burnley will have to apply against the big sides in the league. One concern that I hear a lot is that he looked lost in front of goal until last season. I believe that a big reason for that change is that he began running at the defensive line consistently, rather than straying out wide or staying deep. This new found aggression and focus put him in a place to just score goals, and he did that in a huge way, bagging 21 and earning Player of the Year in The Championship. 8-10 goals from Ings seems like a good possibility, and, if he reaches that total, he represents good value at just £6m.
Make sure that he’s in Stoke’s first team before you include him in yours, but the diminutive Spaniard might actually be in a position to succeed now. He’ll employ his talents while surrounded by the protection of Stoke’s heavyweights. Look for players like Crouch and Arnautovic to set him up from knockdowns and for him to find more space because of their aerial threat. I’ve brought him in as a substitute to monitor his performance over the first couple weeks. If he impresses he could be a great buy. We will also find out if he can, after all, do it on a wet night in Stoke.
If Leicester continues to employ it’s 4-4-2 this season, count on Albrighton to rack up the assists from midfield. The direct winger has a great cross on him and natural pace. His greatest weakness, strength, should be mitigated by the formation’s ability to earn him one-on-one situations on the flanks.
Harry Redknapp has decided to go three at the back for some odd reason. Take advantage of this and get a winger/midfielder who’s a defender in name. Isla was particularly good at that role as Lichtsteiner’s deputy at Juventus and should be one of the best players in a strangely concocted QPR side.
Suggesting a member of Arsenal’s first team as a sleeper might seem a little odd, but at a price of only £5.5m, many might pass over him when looking at the best defenders. Sharing the flanks with players like Alexis Sanchez and Theo Walcott should free him up a lot of room, but also provide a bunch of assists as they are players that can score from the wing in Arsene Wenger’s 4-3-3. This could be a huge season for him.